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ABSTRACT   This article distinguishes between states acting as environmental leaders or 
pioneers. While leaders usually actively seek to attract followers, this is not normally the case 
for pioneers. Dependent on their internal and external ambitions states may take on the 
position of a laggard, pioneer, pusher or symbolic leader. When doing so, states employ 
various combinations of types and styles of leadership or pioneership. Four types of 
leadership/pioneership - structural, entrepreneurial, cognitive and exemplary - and two styles 
of leadership/pioneership - transactional/humdrum and transformational/heroic - are used to 
assess leaders and pioneers. The novel analytical framework put forward is intended to 
generate greater conceptual clarity which is urgently needed for more meaningful theory-
guided cumulative empirical research on leaders and pioneers.  
 
KEY WORDS Change; environment; leaders; pioneers;; positions; powers, types and styles 
of leadership.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies of Comparative Politics (CP) and International Relations (IR) have seen a 
proliferation of analytical terms such as leader, pioneer, pusher state, pioneer, first mover, 
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and pace setter to describe putative agents of change in domestic and European Union (EU) 
policy-making and in international regime creation. The proliferation of competing analytical 
terms has led to analytical confusion thus making difficult the emergence of theory-guided 
cumulative empirical research on the actions and impact of leaders and pioneers which are 
widely perceived as important agents of change.  
There has long been a wide use of the terms leaders and, though to a lesser degree, pioneers  
in CP and IR studies focusing on environmental issues including: (1) international 
environmental regimes in general (e.g. Young 1991; Underdal 1994) and climate change 
regimes in particular (e.g. Gupta and Grubb 2000; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007; Wurzel and 
Connelly 2011); (2) EU environmental policy (e.g. Héritier 1996; Andersen and Liefferink 
1997; Liefferink and Andersen 1998; Jordan et al. 2010); and (3) national environmental 
policy capacity (e.g. Jänicke and Weidner 1997; Liefferink et al. 2009). If a relatively 
extensive literature already exists, why is it useful to arrive at an analytically more-fine 
grained and more robust conceptual framework for empirical research on (environmental) 
leaders and pioneers? Many studies have used the terms environmental leaders and pioneers 
(as well as related terms) interchangeably while failing to provide clear definitions. The lack 
of conceptual clarity comes at a price which can be seen, for example, in the inflationary use 
of the terms environmental pioneers and leaders (as well as related terms) for an ever wider 
range of actors (e.g. states, the EU, international organisations, cities, businesses, NGOs and 
individuals) and their wide-ranging leadership and/or pioneering activities (cf. Liefferink and 
Wurzel, 2013).  
The main aim of this article is to put forward a more clearly defined, differentiated analytical 
framework which is more robust in analytical terms and should thus encourage theory-guided 
cumulative empirical research on leaders and pioneers. We draw on new empirical findings 
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from original research(1) and the existing primary and secondary literature. The conceptual 
framework developed in this article does not assume ex ante that particular states will show a 
clear preference for certain positions, types and styles. Instead we argue that there is a need to 
establish empirically whether national preferences exist or whether states adopt different 
positions, types and styles depending on the sub-sector or even issue at stake. We will 
demonstrate the relevance of our analytical framework for theory-guided cumulative research 
with reference to existing studies and new empirical findings. Nevertheless, our proposed 
analytical framework will need to be ‘tested’ by additional future research.   
This article will focus on states which have traditionally been at the centre of the 
environmental leaders and pioneers literature. It analyses the different positions that leaders 
and pioneers may adopt while investigating which types and styles of leadership they may 
employ to articulate those positions on the domestic, EU and international levels. However, 
we first clarify the analytical meaning of the terms leaders and pioneers. 
Helms (2012: 2) has noted that ‘leadership is a notoriously elusive and contested concept’ 
while Young (1991: 281) has pointed out that leadership is ‘a complex phenomenon, ill-
defined, poorly understood, and subject to recurrent controversy’. Almost the same could be 
said about pioneers. The Oxford English Dictionary (2015) defines a leader as someone ‘who 
conducts, precedes as a guide, leads a person by the hand or an animal by a cord, etc.’ and a 
pioneer as ‘[a] member of an infantry group going with or ahead of an army or regiment to 
dig trenches, repair roads, and clear terrain in readiness for the main body of troops’. In other 
words, a pioneer is ahead of the troops or the pack. Pioneers carry out activities which, 
depending on the subsequent circumstances and events ‘in the field’, may or may not help 
others to follow. A leader, on the other hand, has the explicit aim of leading others, and, if 
necessary, to push others into a follower position. Therefore leaders usually attract followers 
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or at least aim to do so (e.g. Burns 1978, 2003; Helms 2012) while this is not necessarily the 
case for pioneers. Due to space constraints our article neither focuses on the interrelations 
between leaders and followers nor does it assess how leaders and pioneers are perceived by 
third states. Instead it aims to provide an analytically more meaningful classification of 
environmental leadership and pioneering activities (pioneership for short). We argue that 
although in theory the same types and styles of leadership/pioneership are available for both 
leaders and pioneers, in practice leaders and pioneers will normally exhibit preferences for 
different combinations of types and styles of leadership. 
Nye (2008: 27) has argued that ‘[y]ou cannot lead if you do not have power. ... Those with 
more power in a relationship are better placed to make and resist change’ while Burns (1978: 
12) has claimed that ‘[t]o understand the nature of leadership requires understanding of the 
essence of power, for leadership is a special form of power’. Clearly power does play an 
important role for leadership. However, most of the CP and IR literature agrees that although 
‘leadership has something to do with power... it is not synonymous with power’ (Helms 2012: 
3; see also Young 1991; Nye 2008). For Burns (1978: 19) ‘[a]ll leaders are actual or potential 
power holders, but not all power holders are leaders’. The literature on environmental 
pioneers, on the other hand rarely focuses on issues of power (e.g. Andersen and Liefferink 
1997; Liefferink and Andersen 1998). At first sight it may therefore appear that a leader has 
some form of power while this is not the case for a pioneer. However, in this article we argue 
that both leaders and pioneers usually possess some form of power although the types of 
power which they can acquire and the resulting types of leadership and pioneership usually 
differ for leaders and pioneers. By also making use of the styles concept we distinguish 
analytically between transactional or humdrum activities and transformational or heroic 
actions by leaders and pioneers but also introduce a temporal dimension which is missing 




AMBITIONS AND POSITIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PIONEERS AND LEADERS  
 A leader state has the explicit ambition to lead others, while a pioneer state’s priority is to 
develop its own pioneering activities without paying (much) attention to attracting followers. 
Arguably the main reason for this is that leader and pioneer states foster their internal and 
external ambitions to different degrees. The observation that leaders and pioneers, like the 
Roman god Janus, may have divergent ‘faces’ (Liefferink et al. 2009), provides the starting 
point for a more systematic distinction between different types of leaders and pioneers which 
we develop in this article.  
Prittwitz (1984) differentiates between states’ domestic (or internal) and foreign (or external) 
environmental policies. Although this differentiation is contestable, it is relatively widely 
accepted in the literature. Categorising a state’s internal and external ambitions as low or 
high, allows us to arrive at a characterization of the underlying positions of leaders and 
pioneers as set out in Table 1(2).  
 








Low external environmental 
ambitions 





High external environmental 
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Table 1 distinguishes the following four positions: 
(a) Low internal and low external ambitions do not allow a state to become a leader or 
pioneer. Instead such actors are classified as laggards (or, at best, latecomers).  
(b) High internal and low external ambitions lead to a pioneer position. A typical pioneer 
is ahead of others, but does not care about followers. In fact, a genuine pioneer may 
feel constrained by slower partners and/or followers and thus try to ‘go it alone’ by 
opting out of common EU policies and/or international treaties which could stifle its 
high domestic ambitions. A pioneer may nevertheless attract followers which may 
emulate its actions (Holzinger and Knill 2008), although this usually constitutes an 
unintentional external consequence of the pioneer’s internal actions.  
(c) Low internal and high external ambitions turn states into a symbolic leader which 
usually displays little more than window-dressing or ‘cost-free leadership’ (Liefferink 
and Birkel 2011).  
(d) A combination of high internal and high external ambitions turns an actor into a 
pusher which takes the lead domestically and actively seeks to push other states to 
follow its example. We further differentiate between a constructive pusher and a 
conditional pusher which both have high internal and external ambitions. However, 
while a constructive pusher intentionally sets a good example which it wants others to 
follow (in contrast to a pioneer which does so unintentionally), a conditional pusher 
will adopt policy measures to implement its internal ambitions only if other states 
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adopt similar measures. For a constructive pusher, environmental ambitions override 
economic concerns while for a conditional pusher (for which the economic level 
playing field argument is central) it is the other way round. 
Three related conceptual issues have to be clarified before we can explore further how leaders 
and pioneers use different types and styles of leadership/pioneership. 
First, distinguishing high from low environmental ambitions may at first sight appear straight 
forward. In practice, however, what is beneficial for the environment is often contested 
(Weidner et al. 2011; Knill et al. 2012). For example, biofuels were initially used to reduce 
fossil fuel consumption which contributes towards climate change. Nowadays biofuels are, 
however, increasingly perceived as leading to an irresponsible use of scarce arable land. 
Another example constitutes nuclear energy which France tried to promote on the EU level as 
a ‘renewable energy’ in the fight against climate change while others have criticised this 
energy source as unsafe, expensive and non-renewable (Interview, EU official, 2013). 
Clearly, there is a normative dimension involved in defining what constitutes an 
environmental leader and pioneer. This has been emphasized also in the general leadership 
literature by both CP scholars (e.g. Burns 1978,; Helms 2012) and IR researchers (e.g. Young 
1991).  
Second, environmental ambitions may change over time. Over the years leaders and pioneers 
come and go. The USA and Japan acted as environmental leaders in the 1970s and 1980s 
respectively but have rarely done so since (Jänicke 2005). The environmental pioneer 
positions of the EU’s initial ‘green trio’ - Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands - became 
clearly discernible only from the 1980s onwards (Liefferink et al. 2009). However, since the 
2010s, at least on climate change the Netherlands has provided little more than ‘cost-free 
leadership’ (Liefferink and Birkel 2011) or even abdicated as a leader (Interview, EU official, 
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2013). Semi-permanent coalitions of environmental leaders across a wide range of 
environmental issues do not exist on the EU level. Instead ‘they have to be formed on an 
issue-by-issue basis and remain liable to defection’ (Liefferink and Andersen 1998: 262). 
However, even without formal coordination and despite frequent defections on particular 
issues environmental leaders nevertheless often end up pushing for similar goals. 
Importantly, depending on the issue at stake, states may decide to act as leaders or pioneers 
only in certain phases (e.g. agenda setting) of the EU policy-making process and/or the 
international regime creation process. The main reasons for this are usually shifts in domestic 
preferences and the changing dynamics in the EU and/or international context (Weidner et al. 
2011). For example, the 2008 financial crises has made many environmental leader/pioneer 
states less ambitious and more cost-conscious.  
Denmark offers a good example of small states being able to provide leadership in particular 
phases of the highly institutionalised EU policy-making process. Considering its small size, 
Denmark has limited power to act as a leader in the decision-taking phase of the EU policy-
making process (especially under qualified majority voting for which Member States’ votes 
are weighted according to their population sizes) or in international negotiations. In the early, 
more informal phases of the EU policy-making process or the international regime creation 
process, Denmark can however articulate its external environmental ambitions more 
effectively. Denmark owes much of its environmental leader reputation within the EU to its 
efforts in shaping the EU’s environmental policy agenda (Liefferink and Andersen 1998; 
Interview, Danish official, 2011). A large Member State like Germany, in contrast, is in a 
better position to exert leadership throughout all decision-making phases (Interviews, EU and 
German officials, 2013-14)3. As will be explained below, these differences in timing can be 
linked to the extent to which different types of leadership can be exerted by states in different 
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phases of the EU policy-making and international regime creation processes. Importantly, the 
(sixth-monthly) rotating Council Presidency allows all member states (including small 
member states) to exert considerable influence at the helm of the EU (e.g. Wurzel, 1996). 
There is no equivalent institutional mechanism at the international level.  
Thirdly, a state may qualify as environmental leader or pioneer either by being the first to 
propagate or introduce a certain environmental policy innovation or by exhibiting the highest 
level of ambition (e.g. strictest standard). These two features may be combined. For instance, 
it is possible that a state is first in introducing a carbon tax while follower states adopt higher 
carbon taxes and/or more comprehensive ecological tax reforms. As Burns (2003: 26) has put 
it (while discussing a different political issue): ‘Followers might outstrip leaders. They might 
become leaders themselves’. Both ‘the first in class’ and ‘the best in class’ can in principle be 
viewed as leaders or pioneers although the motivations underlying their differing ambitions 
and the subsequent consequences may be different.  
 
POSITIONS AND TYPES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP 
A wide range of definitions of different types of leadership exists in the literature. For 
example, Young (1991) differentiates between structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual 
leadership while Underdal (1994) identifies coercive, instrumental and unilateral leadership. 
Grubb and Gupta (2000) distinguish between structural, instrumental and directional 
leadership. In this article we follow Wurzel and Connelly’s (2011) typology which builds 
especially on Young (1991) by distinguishing between structural, entrepreneurial and 




First, structural leadership relates to an actor’s hard power (Nye 2008) and depends on 
material resources such as military power and economic strength. Apart from ecological 
security conflicts about scarce resources (e.g. water), the relevance of military power tends to 
be low for environmental problem-solving. For example, climate change could not be 
prevented or mitigated by even the world’s most powerful state(s) through military power 
alone. For most environmental issues structural power relies usually primarily on economic 
power. This may involve granting access for imports to domestic markets or the Single 
European Market only if such products comply with environmental standards.  
Structural leadership (or the lack of it) may be related also to a state’s contribution to a 
particular environmental problem. For example, the fact that China now accounts for roughly 
one quarter of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions, gives it considerable leverage (i.e. 
structural power).  
Second, entrepreneurial leadership involves diplomatic, negotiating and bargaining skills in 
facilitating compromise solutions and agreements. Young (1991: 293) identifies as crucial for 
entrepreneurial leaders the ‘negotiating skills to frame issues in ways that foster integrative 
bargaining’. In other words, being able to design complex package deals which offer benefits 
to all parties involved is an important entrepreneurial leadership skill.  However, we do not 
count as entrepreneurial leadership actions which water down or prevent environmental 
agreements. As explained above, environmental leadership/pioneership involves a normative 
dimension which requires the leader/ pioneer to facilitate rather than to veto ambitious 
environmental measures which help to solve collective action problems.  
Thirdly, cognitive leadership involves defining or redefining of interests through ideas, as 
embodied in concepts such as sustainable development (which assumes that economic, social 
and environmental concerns should be given equal weight) and ecological modernisation 
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(which propagates that ambitious environmental measures are beneficial for both the 
environment and economy). Cognitive leadership may entail scientific expertise on the causes 
and effects of and possible solutions to environmental problems, but also ‘experiential’ 
knowledge ‘about how policies actually work at the street level or company level, and how 
implementation problems can be solved effectively’ (Haverland and Liefferink 2012: 184). 
Moreover, cognitive leadership may also include what Dyson (2014: 5) has called ‘arguing 
power’ which stems from the ‘capacity to frame how policy issues… are debated’ and allows 
actors ‘to set the normative standards of policy evaluation’.  
The timing and sequencing of different types of leadership is crucial because cognitive 
leadership operates on a different timescale to structural and entrepreneurial leadership. 
Cognitive leadership (in Young’s terminology intellectual leadership) 
…is a deliberative (…) process; it is difficult to articulate coherent systems of thought 
in the midst of the fast-paced negotiations associated with institutional bargaining. It 
is also in part due to the fact that new ideas generally have to triumph over the 
entrenched mindsets or worldviews held by policymakers, so that the process of 
injecting new intellectual capital into policy streams is generally a time-consuming 
one. (Young 1991: 298)  
We can now link the different types of leadership/pioneership with the positions of leaders 
and pioneers identified in Table 1. In doing so, we focus on the different types of 
leadership/pioneership which both leaders and pioneers use externally vis-a-vis other states, 
the EU and international organisations. As neither pioneers nor laggards aspire to play an 
active external role, in theory they do not need to exhibit external leadership. However, a 
pioneer may unintentionally assume an external role by setting an example for others.  
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In empirical terms the most straightforward case is that of a pusher which, driven by its high 
internal ambitions, articulates its position externally with the help of structural leadership. 
Germany pushing for the ‘clean car’ in the 1980s constitutes a classic example. Germany, 
which hosts both Europe’s largest domestic car industry and the EU’s largest domestic car 
market, used its structural powers to get other member states (and the European Parliament) to 
agree to EU legislation which brought about the introduction of the three-way catalytic 
converter and unleaded petrol against initial fierce opposition from France, Italy and the UK 
(Wurzel 2002). In terms of both car production and emissions, Germany was therefore 
systemically the most significant Member State. Importantly, entrepreneurial leadership (e.g. 
diplomatic skills) and cognitive leadership (e.g. technical expertise) came into play as well, 
although it is safe to assume that a Member State with similar environmental ambitions but 
fewer structural leadership powers (e.g. Denmark) would not have achieved the same 
outcome or only within a much longer timeframe.  
Even an actor with low environmental ambitions may use structural leadership thus turning it 
into a symbolic leader. For example, the US successfully pushed for the inclusion of 
emissions trading as a novel policy instrument to reduce more cost-effectively greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGE) under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The US’s preferred policy instrument was 
opposed by the EU and its Member States which however proposed significantly higher 
GHGE reduction targets. Ironically the US later failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol thus 
arguably becoming a climate change laggard although it had managed to ‘upload’ to the 
international level its favoured policy instrument (Jordan et al. 2010; Wurzel and Connelly 
2011).  
States may, however, pursue both high internal and external ambitions – and thus act as 
pushers – without being able to offer much in terms of structural leadership. In the absence of 
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significant structural leadership such states arguably translate their ambitions into external 
positions primarily with the help of a combination of entrepreneurial and cognitive 
leadership. A case in point is Denmark. Considering it is a small Member State, Denmark has 
managed to have a disproportionally large impact on EU environmental policy (Liefferink and 
Andersen 1998). Although it is theoretically possible for states to adopt a pusher position 
which relies on either entrepreneurial or cognitive leadership, it is likely that both will be 
combined. The main reason for this is that scientific expertise and experiential knowledge (i.e. 
cognitive power) without well-targeted and well-timed diplomatic efforts (i.e. entrepreneurial 
power) usually fail to convince policy makers from other states, the EU or international 
organisations (Haverland and Liefferink 2012). Or as Nye (2008: 9) has put it: ‘generating 
influential ideas is not the same as mobilising people for action’.  
Importantly, combined entrepreneurial and cognitive leadership may also be used in the 
absence of high internal ambitions thus leading to symbolic leadership. A good example 
constitute the negotiations on the EU’s ‘burden-sharing agreement’ which allocated 
differentiated GHGE reduction targets to Member States on the basis of the EU’s collective 
(8%) Kyoto Protocol target. In the EU negotiations, the Netherlands acted as a knowledge 
broker by skilfully propagating a complex compromise proposal in the form of the ‘triptych 
approach’. It did so, however, in the conspicuous absence of domestic environmental 
ambition (Liefferink and Birkel 2011: 157-8).  
If states have in place the necessary capacity for structural leadership, then they can usually 
mobilise it instantly. The same applies to entrepreneurial leadership provided that sufficient, 
competent diplomatic staff are available. However, a different timescale usually applies to 
cognitive leadership. It usually takes time for new ‘intellectual capital’ (Young 1991: 298) to 
gain acceptance by third states, the EU and international organisations. Moreover, scientific 
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expertise and experiential knowledge is usually generated on the domestic level only over a 
longer time period. This is relevant in particular for pushers without significant structural 
leadership capacity (e.g. small states). If such states want their external ambitions to succeed 
then they will have to rely on a combination of entrepreneurial and cognitive leadership. The 
required expertise can only be made available externally at the appropriate moment if well-
developed domestic capacities (e.g. knowledge infrastructure) are already in place (Haverland 
and Liefferink 2012). Importantly, such expertise is in high demand in particular in the 
agenda setting and early policy formulation phases whereas structural leadership plays a key 
role in the subsequent adoption phase (Naurin and Wallace 2010). This explains why pushers 
without significant structural leadership capacities (e.g. small states) may nevertheless 
become influential in the early phases of the EU policy-making and/or the international 
regime creation processes.   
So far we have focused on pushers which are actors that explicitly aspire to lead others (i.e. to 
attract followers). But actors without high external ambitions may also have an impact on 
other states, the EU or international regimes. This applies in particular to pioneers. Being 
‘ahead of the pack’, pioneers’ activities may be followed by other states through, for example, 
lesson-drawing, emulation, diffusion and policy transfer (e.g. Holzinger and Knill 2008). In 
such cases, structural, entrepreneurial or cognitive types of pioneership are unnecessary. This 
leads us to identify a fourth type of leadership/pioneership which is ‘leadership or pioneership 
by example’ or exemplary leadership/pionnership. 
Conceptually, exemplary leadership/pioneership comes close to directional leadership as 
defined by Grubb and Gupta (2000) although the two concepts are not identical. Directional 
leadership assumes an intention to set an example to follow. It therefore does not apply to 
pioneers. In other words, a directional leader wants to lead others by attracting followers. In 
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this article, directional leadership therefore corresponds to a constructive pusher position. 
Constructive pushers (i.e. states with both high internal and external ambitions) may adopt 
domestic policy measures which are aimed at acting as examples for others. This argument is 
in line with Nye (2004: 5, as cited in Masciulli 2009: 461) who argues: ‘Leadership … is not 
just about issuing commands… but also involves leading by example and attracting others to 
do what you want… Having others to buy into your values’. Often constructive pushers 
actively use experiential knowledge gained at the domestic level in their efforts to convince 
others of the feasibility of their preferred external policy solutions.  
In contrast, exemplary leadership/pioneership as defined in our article, can also be exerted 
unintentionally as happens in the case of pioneers. An ideal-typical pioneer has no external 
ambitions. It is not interested in attracting followers, does not provide external leadership and 
fails to exert any other externally directed types of leadership. If a pioneer’s domestic policy 
innovations nevertheless serve as examples for other states, the EU or international regimes 
then they do so as an unintended consequence.  Sweden’s ambitious chemicals policy offers a 
good example. Though initially developed solely for domestic reasons, it soon became a 
model for the EU’s European Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals 
(REACH) Regulation (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998)(4). Exemplary leadership as defined in 
this article thus refers to both intentional example-setting by constructive pushers (i.e. 
directional leadership in Grubb and Gupta’s terminology) and unintentional example-setting 
by pioneers.  
Table 2 links the different positions of leaders and pioneers to different types of 
leadership/pioneership. A laggard has neither internal nor external ambitions and therefore 
does not exhibit leadership. However – and although this article does not seek to assess the 
interrelations between leaders and followers – it is important to remember that laggards are 
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potential followers. Therefore, laggards are important addressees for the actions of leaders. A 
pioneer has no significant external ambitions, although it may nevertheless exert external 
impact through exemplary leadership. For pushers and symbolic leaders, there are two 
principle options. First, they can try to lead others by using structural leadership (e.g. 
economic power). In doing so, they may supplement their structural leadership with 
entrepreneurial leadership (e.g. negotiating skills) and cognitive leadership (e.g. scientific 
expertise). Second, if structural leadership capacities are limited, leader states are likely to 
rely on a combination of entrepreneurial and cognitive leadership. In addition, a constructive 
pusher can utilise exemplary leadership which is less relevant for a conditional pusher 
because the latter makes its internal policies conditional upon other states adopting similar 
policies. Exemplary leadership will usually be combined with cognitive leadership (e.g. 
experiential knowledge). It is normally not relevant for a symbolic leader which, by 
definition, does not have in place actual internal policies when propagating high 
environmental ambitions externally. However, as will be explained below, under certain 
circumstances, symbolic leaders may actually be ‘forced’ (e.g. by the EU) to adopt internal 
policies that will reduce the credibility gap which normally opens up between a symbolic 
leader’s ambitious rhetoric and its lack of actual policies.  
 





 Structural  Entrepreneurial  Cognitive  Exemplary  
Laggard   - - - - 
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Pioneer  - - - x 
Pusher either x (x) (x) (x)* 
or (x) x x (x)* 
Symbolic leader either x (x) (x) (x) 
or (x) x x  - 
 
Note: ‘x’ means ‘essential’; ‘(x)’ means ‘possible, but not essential’; ‘-‘ means ‘not relevant’. 
*Exemplary power is relevant for constructive but not for conditional pushers 
 
STYLES OF LEADERSHIP 
Having identified and explained four different types of leadership/pioneership – structural, 
entrepreneurial, cognitive and exemplary– which leaders and pioneers may exhibit, we can 
now introduce different styles of leadership/pioneership that both leaders and pioneers can 
utilise when trying to achieve their external (environmental) ambitions. Adding a style 
dimension has three major analytical advantages. First, it allows us to develop a more fine 
grained analysis of how (e.g. in a humdrum or heroic manner) leaders and pioneers try to 
achieve their external ambitions. Second, it enables us to introduce a time dimension (e.g. 
short or long term) for external activities of leaders and pioneers. Third, it helps to provide a 
more comprehensive explanation for the actual impact in terms of incremental or 
‘revolutionary’ change on the EU and/or international level. Leaders’ external ambitions may, 
however, fail to result in tangible impact in which case they lead to inertia rather than change.  
We use a conceptual differentiation of leadership/pioneership styles which draws on Hayward 
(1975, 2008), who has usefully distinguished humdrum from heroic leadership, and Burns 
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(1978, 2003) who has helpfully differentiated between transactional and transformational 
leadership(5). We argue that although transactional and humdrum styles as well as 
transformational and heroic styles are very closely related, subtle differences exist (Wurzel 
and Connelly 2011). Arguably the differentiation between humdrum and heroic aims to focus 
more strongly on how leaders and pioneers use leadership/pioneership without ignoring their 
impact (or the lack of it) while the distinction between transactional and transformational 
focuses more strongly on the actual impact of leadership/pioneership activities without 
ignoring how actors use leadership/pioneership.  
Following Lindblom’s (1959) concept of muddling through, Hayward (1975, 2008: 6) defined 
a humdrum leadership style as one which ‘does not have an explicit, overriding, long-term 
objective and action is incremental, departing only slightly from existing policies as 
circumstances require’. Change instigated by a humdrum style therefore takes the form of 
marginal adjustments. In contrast, a heroic style ‘sets explicit long-term objectives to be 
pursued by maximum coordination of public policies and by an ambitious assertion of 
political will’ (Hayward 2008: 7). Heroic leadership can usually be offered only infrequently 
and/or in exceptional circumstances. Importantly, for Hayward (1975: 5) a heroic leadership 
style is heroic ‘in the dual sense that it would be both an ambitious political exercise in 
rational decision-making and an ambitious assertion of political will by government leaders’ 
(Hayward 1975: 5).  
For Burns (2003: 375), transactional leadership is aimed at achieving ‘short-term expedient 
goals rather than long-term political strategy’. It amounts to reactive leadership which adjusts 
to external circumstances (Burns 2003: 5). In contrast, transformational leadership aims to 
bring about profound or even revolutionary change. According to Burns (2003: 24) 
transformational leadership ‘is to cause a metamorphosis in form or structure, a change in the 
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very condition or nature of a thing… a radical change’. Transformational 
leadership/pioneership requires an active or pro-active decisional style which pursues long 
term objectives. Importantly transactional and transformational styles should be perceived as 
part of a continuum. Although transactional leadership usually fosters only incremental 
piecemeal changes ‘[c]ontinual transaction over a long period of time can produce 
transformation’ (Burns 2003: 25). Streeck and Thelen (2005) have similarly argued that 
continuous incremental (institutional) change can eventually result in transformational 
(institutional) change.  
Because no exact measurement scales exist for differentiating empirically between a 
transactional and a transformational style it can be challenging to do so. However, it is 
relatively easy to find empirical examples of both styles. A good example of a 
transformational style constitutes Germany’s energy transition (Energiewende) which aims to 
bring about the rapid full-scale transformation of fossil fuel based energy by renewable 
energy sources. Germany arguably adopted a transformational style, the reliance on which 
became more urgent with the decision to phase out the domestic use of nuclear power by 
2022. Fairly radical change is required to bring about the planned energy transition which one 
German Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt - UBA) official described as a ‘grand social 
experiment’ (Interview, 2014). Importantly, while adopting a domestic energy transformation, 
Germany also lobbied hard externally for ambitious EU renewable energy and energy 
efficiency targets while being the main driver behind the International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA) (Interview, German and EU officials, 2013-14). In this case Germany 
therefore showed transformational pioneership on the domestic level and transformational 
leadership on the international level. Both in the above mentioned car emission and in the 
energy transformation case Germany exhibited high internal and external ambitions. 
However, only in the renewable energy case did Germany adopt a transformational style (i.e. 
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a radical and rapid change) while the introduction of the three-way catalytic converter and 
unleaded petrol was achieved by a transactional style which triggered the adoption of an end-
of-pipe technology.    
Above we have argued that structural and, though to a lesser degree, entrepreneurial 
leadership/pioneership can usually be activated more or less instantly. However, for cognitive 
leadership to succeed states will have to display both pro-active efforts and staying power 
over a considerable time; short bouts of leadership even if carried out in pro-active fashion 
will not suffice for goal attainment which requires cognitive leadership. Occasionally 
promoting ecological modernisation at only one or a few EU and/or international summits or 
in only one of the multi-layered EU negotiating settings (e.g. the Council and its working 
groups) is unlikely to succeed.   
In Figure 1 we have combined the four main positions – laggard, pioneer, pusher and 
symbolic leader – which states can adopt with the different styles. Figure 1 illustrates that 
laggards have no environmental ambitions while pioneers usually exhibit high internal and 
low external ambitions. A (constructive and conditional) pusher, on the other hand, combines 
high internal with high external environmental ambitions. Finally, a symbolic leader normally 
combines high external with low internal ambitions. 
We argue that in principle all four types of leadership/pioneership – structural, 
entrepreneurial, cognitive and exemplary – can be used in combination with either a 
humdrum/transactional or with a heroic/transformational leadership/pioneership style. 
Leaving aside laggards, this implies that both styles are in principle relevant for all four 
leader/pioneer positions. However, a pioneer with low or no external ambitions which relies 
mainly on exemplary leadership, is unlikely to adopt a heroic/transformational style 
externally. Similarly, a symbolic leader will have difficulties in acting as a credible 
21 
 
heroic/transformational leader in the longer term (but see below). Importantly, constructive 
and conditional pushers, which combine high internal and high external ambitions, are most 
likely to exert credible heroic/transformational leadership/pioneership.  
 
Figure 1: Positions and Styles of Environmental Leaders and Pioneers  
 
 
In the 1990s the EU’s ‘green trio’ arguably adopted a heroic leadership style in EU and 
international climate change politics when demanding fairly ambitious GHGE reduction 
targets although, at the time, these targets were largely symbolic as they had not (yet) been 
backed up by domestic or EU policies (Wurzel and Connelly, 2011). In other words these 
three Member States exhibited heroic leadership externally while relying at best on a 
humdrum style domestically, thus acting as symbolic leaders. However, as Jänicke (2011: 
142) has observed in Germany’s case, a symbolic leader which adopts a heroic leadership 
style may find itself caught by a ‘kind of “enforced leadership”’ through EU institutions (e.g. 
the Commission) and, although to a lesser degree, international organisations. Symbolic 
leaders may thus be ‘forced’ to live up to their external ambitions by closing the ‘credibility 
gap’  which may have opened up between external ambitions and the lack of corresponding 
internal policies (Wurzel and Connelly, 2011). The external positioning of a symbolic leader 
may therefore, at least under certain circumstances, lead to domestic policy (implementation) 
measures through a ‘multi-level reinforcement’ mechanism (Jänicke 2014). Schreurs and 
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Tiberghien (2007: 25) have pushed this argument further when stating that ‘multi-level 
governance has not just multiple veto points, it has created numerous leadership points where 
competitive leadership has been initiated’. This could help to explain why EU and 
international climate change negotiations have not grounded to a halt despite the existence of 
multiple veto actors.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Having developed a more nuanced and analytically more robust conceptualisation of leaders 
and pioneers than can be found in the existing literature, we return to the question why this 
exercise should be relevant or interesting to other researchers. In other words, we aim to 
address the ‘So what?’ question. We offer four main reasons for why the conceptual 
classifications developed in this article ought to be of interest to other researchers. First, as 
pointed out above, there has been a proliferation of analytical terms such as leader, pioneer, 
first mover, etc. to describe putative agents of change in national, EU and international 
environmental politics. More theory-guided cumulative empirical research is needed to 
explain better the actions and impact of leaders and pioneers which are widely perceived by 
both social scientists and practitioners as important agents of change. Our analytical 
leadership/pioneership classification aims to facilitate such research. It should render 
unnecessary the reinvention of the wheel in analytical terms when analysing (environmental) 
leaders and pioneers (for a first attempt at applying the framework, see: Wurzel et al. 2016).  
Second, although (due to space constraints) this article has focused only on states, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that non-state actors may also play an important role as putative 
agents of change or, in other words, leaders and pioneers. Under the analytical banner of 
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polycentric governance, studies on environmental leaders and pioneers have increasingly 
focused also on non-state actors (cf. Jordan et al., 2014). This analytical trend has accelerated 
since the 2008 financial crises, partly because some environmental leader and pioneer states 
have become more cost-conscious while toning down (some of) their environmental 
ambitions. Such a development makes even more important the existence of a highly 
differentiated but analytically robust conceptual framework which could help to foster theory-
guided cumulative research on a range of actors by both CP and IR scholars. The analytical 
framework for states which we have developed in this article may also provide a starting point 
for investigating leadership/pioneership by non-state actors although modifications are likely 
to be required.  
Third, simply classifying a state (or non-state actor) as a leader or pioneer is a fairly blunt 
analytical assessment. As this article has shown, it usually tells us little about the actors’ 
motivations and positions which may differ considerably. For example, there is a significant 
difference between the motivations and strategies of constructive pushers, which will take the 
lead regardless of whether others follow, and conditional pushers which will adopt costly 
environmental measures only if others adopt the same or similar measures.  In other words, 
there may be differences between internal and external ambitions which matter both in 
analytical and practical terms. In an increasingly interdependent world the motivations and 
actions of pioneers (which want as much autonomy as possible for progressive domestic 
environmental actions) may seem anachronistic. However, environmental policy research has 
shown that pioneers which experiment with novel tools, approaches, institutional 
arrangements, etc. are crucial for the development and spread of environmental innovations 
(e.g. Jänicke 2005).  
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Fourth, the introduction of a style dimension into the research on leaders and pioneers helps to 
explain better both temporal changes (e.g. short-long term leadership/pioneership) by leaders 
and pioneers and the degree of change (e.g. transactional-transformational) which leaders and 
pioneers try to achieve. In other words, it focuses researchers’ attention on the possibility that 
internal and/or external ambitions of (former) leaders and pioneers may change over time. 
The existing literature on leaders and pioneers says little about the importance of the time 
dimension and degree of change.  
Readers will need to decide whether our novel conceptual framework is a step in the right 
direction for the development of theory-guided cumulative research on leaders and pioneers 
which are widely acknowledged as important actors of change.  Clearly, additional research is 
needed to “test” whether our conceptual framework adds analytical value in terms of allowing 
for a more fine-grained but also more robust assessment for theory-guided empirical research 




1. It draws on 15 interviews with British, Danish, Dutch, German and EU policy makers in 
2011 – 2014. 
2. Table 1 draws on Liefferink and Andersen (1998).   
3. Especially in federal states (e.g. Germany and the USA) a considerable degree of 
autonomy exists for sub-national governments on environmental issues.  
4.  Later Sweden developed from a pioneer into a pusher which actively promoted its 
domestic chemicals policy during EU accession negotiations.   
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5. Neither Hayward (1975, 2008) nor Burns (1978, 2003) differentiate leadership from 
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